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Abstract. Traditionally, it was not feasible for businesses to determine the
maximum price the buyer was willing to pay, but with the availability of big
data and the deployment of sophisticated algorithms, with a great degree of
precision businesses can ascertain the maximum willingness price. Some forms
of price discrimination are prohibited under the Robinson-Patman Act of
Antitrust (1890), provided demographic characteristics such as race and gender
are the determining factors. The problem with this interpretation is that sellers
are not transparent about what factors are taken into consideration when
determining price. Current laws are either limited in their interpretation or
inadequate to properly respond to the potential for sellers to exploit the
consumer through discrimination. In this paper, we present a common pricing
strategy, behavioral-based price discrimination, broadly practiced in business,
particularly retailers. In general, price discrimination occurs when instead of a
set price, pricing for a product is determined by what the seller knows about the
customer. This includes historical data indicating what the customer is willing
to pay, combined with certain personal attributes. In this scenario, the same
product may be offered at different prices to different individuals or market
segments. What data points are considered when designing these sophisticated
pricing schemes remains a mystery. Using a dataset containing transactions
collected from 2500 households, we demonstrate price discrimination
empirically by linking consumer spending to certain demographic
characteristics. Additionally, we address the implication of price discrimination
to the economic welfare of the consumer, to market competition, and to
privacy.

1

Introduction

In Economics, price discrimination is a pricing scheme whereby customers are
charged different prices for the same product or service. The basis for which is the
idea that some consumers are willing to pay more for a product or service, and under
a dynamic pricing scheme the seller is able to extract the extra consumer surplus.
There are three degrees [8]: in the first degree, the seller charges the buyer the
maximum price the buyer is willing to pay. In second-degree price discrimination,
price is determined by the quantity purchased. For example, discount offered for bulk
purchases. Finally, in third-degree price discrimination the market is divided into
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segments, and price is based on membership into a particular group. Before the data
gold rush, businesses were only able to leverage the second and third forms of price
discrimination to increase profits. Economist viewed first-degree price discrimination
only as a theoretical frame for optimal market efficiency. Today however, with the
amount of information about consumers that business can now access, first-degree
price discrimination need no longer be relegated to theory: it is now possible for the
seller to know enough about individual buyers to determine the maximum amount
each buyer is willing to pay [1],
[5], [6], [11].
1.1

Big Data

The past few decades have seen a trend toward increasing connectedness and
engagement with technology. The trails about ourselves that we leave behind through
our interactions with businesses and products are beneficial in that they allow for a
more customized experience. For example, every visit or purchase made at a major
local retailer is recorded and documented: these data are collected and stored, then
used to construct a unique profile that is regularly updated to best reflect and predict
individual consumer’s purchasing desires [1,2,3]. Perhaps based on purchasing
history, moreover, certain products will be recommended or one will be sent
marketing materials tailored to one’s unique profile based on previous purchases [2].
A simple trip to your local brick-and-mortar retailer creates the opportunity for
collecting a large number of data points about your purchasing habits. Your data may
be collected from a variety of channels. Most commonly, this occurs when personal
information (age, income level, and other personal identifiers) is provided to the
retailer as part of the sign-up process for a loyalty or frequent-shopper card in the
hope of saving at checkout. This information, combined with data purchased through
third-party data brokers (Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, etc.), can be used for
personal profiling, allowing retailers to tailor marketing campaigns specifically to
each user. Regardless the path taken, many retailers use transaction data as the basis
for the types of coupon deals customers are offered. For example, past transactions
(historical data) may indicate a preference for a particular brand of cereal, and what
one is willing to pay. Rather than send random coupons for products that a given
customer may or may not be interested in, the types of deals/discounts one is offered
are customer-specific, tailored to perceived individual needs and consistent with
previous habits. A company called Catalina, for example, has built a marketing
empire providing personalized digital media solutions to the retail industry.1 When
you are at the checkout line and are given your receipt from Catalina’s point-of-sales
printers, a list of coupons will be printed on the back of your receipt. The product
deals you are offered are based on real-time data points collected about you over the
lifespan of your relationship with this particular retailer. Sending certain types of
coupons to a market segment is an established marketing practice, and is an example
of third-degree price discrimination (PD). In third-degree price discrimination, the
1

Catalina Marketing’s point-of-sale printers reach 90 million households per year.
https://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/catalina-marketing-aims-forthe-cutting-edge-of-big-data/d/d-id/1099971?page_number=1
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market is divided into segments (i.e., students, senior citizens) and the same product
may be sold to each segment at different prices. This is a common and accepted
practice, but what is different now is the increased leveraging of technological tools to
collect and manipulate data for personalization of products and services.

2

Pricing Models and Transparency

While this may seem a win-win for both retailers interested in increasing their
bottom-line and for consumers in getting tailored discount offers, the practice of
collecting data on consumers and attempting to influence purchasing habits without
explicit consent does raise certain questions. Often consumers are unaware that data is
being collected about them and they do not know how it is being used [3]. Though the
collection of data has significantly improved the way businesses engage with
customers and thereby the potential for improved profit, the question of improved
overall consumer welfare remains.
Most retailers who use this practice maintain that only historical data (past
transactions) are employed when designing the models that underpin the targeted
marketing campaigns which incorporate the various coupon offers, there remains no
way for us as the consumers to corroborate this claim. Further, if demographic
variables are used in constructing these models, it is likely concealed.

2.2

Consumer Welfare and Market Competition

Individualized pricing schemes can be implemented in a variety of ways. If viewed
from the perspective of market efficiency, it may seem like a good deal for consumers
to minimize transaction time spent searching for a desired product, or to conveniently
receive customized coupons at an agreeable price. From the retailer’s perspective,
they can use what they know about you to tailor discount offers to you at the most
optimal price point, which may vary from customer to customer based on a variety of
personal factors. With such competing interests, one wonders if consumers,
particularly those enrolled in loyalty programs, are getting the savings expected. It
seems counterintuitive to think that businesses would forgo the ability to increase
profits by utilizing all the tools available to them, especially big data, particularly
when the specifics do not need to be disclosed or can be easily concealed. It is fair to
say that those subscribed to loyalty programs may not necessarily get the lowest
prices [1]. In this respect, the argument could be made that the consumer stands to see
a reduction in overall financial well-being [4]. If market efficiency is contingent upon
the empowered consumer, it is fair to say that with the ubiquitous deployment of big
data and pricing algorithms, the power dynamic has shifted in the favor of business,
thereby challenging the notion of market efficiency.
Further, the convergence of the real and online environments has created for
businesses the opportunity to merge data from various points of contact allowing for
even more granularity in their ability to profile the consumer. Collecting more
disparate information allows business to form a more nuanced and specific profile,
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thereby improving product and service offering. This creates a data feedback loop
(illustrated in Figure 1) where the more data a business has, the better the products
and services it can offer to consumers, the more consumers they are able to attract,
and the more data they are able to collect. This is purported to benefit the consumer
through improved product and service quality, and allow for more choices and market
competition.

Fig. 1. Firms collect data, use algorithms to improve products and services, overall production
improves, attract more customer and collect more data, creating a loop, and eventually, smaller
players can’t compete and new players cannot gain entry to markets [11].

2.3

Sherman Antitrust Act

Many consumers object to the practice of price discrimination on the basis that it is a
violation of fairness, and on the false belief that price discrimination is illegal [2].
Price discrimination is in fact perfectly legal: it is not generally assumed to run afoul
of the Sherman Antitrust Law, which protects consumers from discrimination based
on race, gender, or other sensitive demographic information. Big data has made it
possible for sellers to cobble together enough data points about a buyer to a great
degree of accuracy to predict the maximum they are willing to pay. If, however, the
data points taken into consideration were among the prohibited ones listed above, then
price discrimination would be in violation of the Robertson-Patman Act of the
Sherman Antitrust law. According to the Robertson-Patman Act, “price
discrimination is lawful if the prices reflect actions taken to promote loss of doing
business or an attempt to meet competitors offering [13].” The intent of the
Robertson-Patman Act was to protect retailers against unfavorable prices that could
adversely impact their competitive ability. Further, the Act only applies specifically to
commodities—goods of like grade and quality—and stipulates that sales must be
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made through interstate commerce. This interpretation is limited, and offers
consumers very little protection against exploitative price strategies. In general, the
Antitrust Act seeks to stifle the formation of pricing power through anticompetitive
conduct, rather than reducing existing power or regulating the manner of its exercise
[1], [11]. In other words, the focus has been in protecting consumer welfare indirectly
through promotion of market competition, but big data has enable those firms with
data advantage in some ways to circumvent the traditional consolidation practices
usually viewed as anti-competitive. As it is currently interpreted, the ubiquity of big
data renders obsolete the ability of antitrust to effectively regulate market competition
and protect consumer welfare. The only recourse left to consumers is the hope that
companies, as they thread that fine line between profit optimization and consumer
welfare, will forego their own economic interest and put the consumer’s first by using
the data they collect responsibly. This is an unrealistic prospect. The current systems
in place cannot adequately address this new era of big data. Further, there are no
mechanisms currently in place that could make clear to consumers and the public at
large the exact composition of the models that undergird the pricing strategies used to
price discriminate.

3

Our Approach

To detect price discrimination, we look at what variables most explain or account for
overall household spending after all discounts are applied. Without access to the
pricing models and algorithms used to price discriminate on the household level, or in
this case, coupon offers sent, it is very difficult to establish a causal link. To that end,
based on the premise of consumer welfare (that is, being better off as a result of
tailored product offerings at the best possible values),2 we take the approach that
overall household spending is a good proxy measure for price discrimination if
significantly influenced by demographic attributes. In this case, we define “best
possible value” simply as a proportion of discounts received to total amount spent. If
retailers are using the data collected for better product customization rather than to
exploit personal markers to induce spending, we should expect to see a random
distribution in total spending. If instead patterns begin to emerge based on certain
demographic attributes, then we may be able to point to a systematic mechanism that
cannot be attributed to chance alone.

3.1

Data

The dataset used for this analysis was obtained from Dunnhumby3, a consultancy
company for retail and consumer data science projects. This dataset contains
2
3

Consumer welfare refers to the individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods
and services https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177.
Dunnhumby
Source
Files,
The
complete
journey
[Online].
Available:
https://www.dunnhumby.com/sourcefiles
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household-level transactions collected over a two-year timespan from a group of
2,500 households who are frequent retail shoppers. The data are dispersed amongst
eight tables. For this analysis, we use only two of the eight tables, the demographic
table containing 801 observations and 8 variables, and the transaction table containing
2,500 households, 1048575 observations and 12 variables. We know that the data was
collected over a two year time frame, but the exact time frame is not specified.
Therefore, we cannot take into account seasonal trends and potential impact to
spending. We instead assume that any fluctuation in spending would be observed
across all categories. Further, demographic variables are factorized, such that
comparisons to the general population is not possible. For example, households are
represented with a unique ID. The composition of the household is unknown. The
literature provided with the data indicate that the demographic information used in
this project was captured through the retailer’s loyalty card program. Using the
loyalty card price, we could see exactly what the customer paid at checkout once the
discounts are applied. We used the non-loyalty card price as a baseline measure.
Presumably the non-loyalty price is what regular customers would pay if no retailer
discount was present, and if nothing was known about the shopper’s buying habits or
personal information.
Using these two datasets, we created two distinct tables: one containing
demographic and transaction data for a group identified as loyalty card members and
another table containing just transaction data for the remaining households. This
group is identified as our control group (non-loyalty card members). The original
demographic and transaction dataset contained individual observations for every
household transaction. Since we are only concerned with total spending over this time
period, transactions were summed per household without regard to product type.
From there we used the household_key from the demographic table to join together
all related transactions, establishing this as our loyalty card group. Then, we filtered
the remaining observations as our control group, reducing the original transaction
dataset from 1048575 observations to 1695.
Additional trimming was performed on the final tables to eliminate outliers due to
errors in data entry. For example, we observed in the transaction table that the mean
number of items purchased per trip was 94, the median 1, and the range 0–83055.
Buying 83055 items on one shopping trip seemed improbable. Looking at the top 20
and bottom 20 observations, we could see that on average a typical basket of goods
contained fewer than 10 items. We set the filter on the quantity variable from the
transaction dataset to only include observations > 10. We also removed superfluous
variables not pertinent to our analysis, such as Basket_ID, Day, Product_ID,
Store_ID, Trans_Time and Week_No, and converted discount units to absolute
numbers, leaving us with the following demographic variables:
•
•
•
•
•

Age (ordinal factors: 6 levels)
Income (ordinal factors: 12 levels)
Marriage status (factor: 3 levels)
Homeowner status (factor: 5 levels)
Household size (ordinal factors: 5 levels)
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Dependent continuous variables documenting amount spent and discounted
included:
• Retail discount (retail_disc): Total amount discounted
• Coupon discount (coupon_disc): Amount discounted in retail coupons
• Manufacturers coupons (coupon_match): Amount discounted through
manufacturer coupons (i.e., paid through manufacturer promotional)
Additionally, we created the following two new variables: Total, which consisted of
quantity * sales_value to produce a single value of total amount spent per household;
and, in order to place all observations on a common ratio scale, proportion of retail
discount compared to total amount spent (retail_disc / total). The proportion variable
indexes the “best possible value” a household can receive from the retailer, with a
proportion of 0 indicating no discount, and 1 indicating 100% discount.

4

Analysis

To determine whether membership in the loyalty card program had any effect upon
total spent, retail discount received, and proportion of discount/total, we first
compared control and loyalty group on three variables using independent samples ttests. The loyalty group spent significantly more than control (see Table 1), t(1133) =
19.73, p < .0001; also unsurprisingly, the retail discount received was also
significantly higher in the loyalty group, t(1130) = 19.43, p < .0001. However,
proportion of discount/total was greater in the control group, t(2054) = -3.30, p <
.001. Comparisons are shown in Figure 2. The latter result was unexpected, and
suggests that membership in the loyalty program does not necessarily amount to best
possible value.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Control and Loyalty Groups for three variables of
interest
Control
Loyalty group
Total $ M

1166.69

2818.82

Total $ SD

1413.20

2160.02

Discount $ M

154.81

360.18

Discount $ SD

177.73

272.89

Proportion M

.143

.135

Proportion SD

.067

.05
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Fig. 2a.Comparison of retail discount received by control and loyalty group (Note: Bars show
median and middle quartiles)

Fig. 2b. Comparison of discount proportion received over total by control and loyalty group
(Note: Bars show median and middle quartiles)
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Fig. 2c. Comparison of overall total spent by control and loyalty group (Note: Bars show
median and middle quartiles)

Having determined that control and loyalty groups differed on the three dependent
variables of interest, we next explored their association with demographic factors
within the loyalty group. Since the income variable was considered a priori to be most
significantly associated with consumer spending and discount patterns, we examined
the frequency distribution among the 12 original income levels on our three
dependent variables of interest. As shown in Figure 3, the distribution of incomes was
highly skewed towards the lower brackets. In order to simplify this factor and control
for large differences in N between income groups in later analyses, therefore, we
reduced the factorization to 4 levels: low (under $15 – 34K), low.mid ($35 – 49K),
mid-high ($50 – 74K), and high ($75K +). As can be seen, the reduction led to
roughly equivalent numbers in each group.
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Fig. 3a. Original 12 income levels across total spending

Fig. 3b. Income variable reduced to 4 levels across total spending

In order to test for collinearity of variables before conducting an exploratory linear
regression analysis, we first computed a correlation matrix of all pairs of continuous
variables. Since the proportion variable was not independent (i.e., it is a composite
index of two other variables), it was left out of the analysis. Total and retail_disc were
strongly correlated, r(798) = .82, p < .00001. Coupon variables were correlated with
both total and retail_disc, though at weak levels (r < .30). In initial regression models,
then, these two variables were kept independent in order to avoid distortions due to
collinearity. All demographic variables were entered as predictors into three
regression models for total, retail_disc, and proportion variables. The explanatory
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power for all three models was low (less than 11% variance explained in all models);
however, all income categories showed a statistically significant association with
total, retail_disc, and proportion. Thus, while the magnitude of the effect was small in
absolute terms, income appeared to systematically influence the three dependent
variables.
To determine whether differences in spending/discounts between income groups
were statistically significant, we next computed three one-way ANOVAs (Figure 4).
Total amount spent varied by income, F(3, 796) = 8.13, p < .0001, η 2 = .03. Tukey
HSD post-hoc testing revealed that the high income bracket was significantly
different from the other three. This is logical given that many higher-income people
have more money to spend, which may enable more expensive purchases relative to
households with lower incomes.
In contrast, there was no main effect of income on mean retail discount, F(3, 796)
= 1.53, p = .21. No income group received significantly more or less discounts than
the others: thus, while total trended upward in the high-income group, the discount
remained flat.
This relationship is reflected in the significant difference in proportion related to
income, F(3, 796) = 10.7, p < .0001, η 2 = .04, with a similar post-hoc result indicating
that high income people had significantly lower proportion of discount/total (M = .11)
than the other brackets (M = .14). Though income explains only a small portion of the
total variance (4%), people in the lower 75% of the income distribution received a
greater discount benefit relative to total amount spent. Although no causation can be
inferred from this relationship, it is nonetheless interesting that high-income people
got a “worse deal” than the others: unlike the other groups, for whom discount given
appeared to constrain total spent, high-income people were more likely to have a
higher total despite hitting a ceiling on discount. This could be the result of spending
habits among this group—they are more likely not to need the extra discount benefit
than the other groups, and may be more inclined to spend on more expensive specialty
items that are not offered at discounted prices. It could also be the result of steering,
targeted discounting, and other measures aimed to nudge those of means to spend at
full price. Further research will be required to explore this connection.
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Fig. 4a. ANOVA of 4 level income variable showing the proportion of discount over total
spending

Fig. 4b. ANOVA of 4 level income variable showing retail discount across total spending
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Fig. 4a. ANOVA of 4 level income variable across total spending

5

Previous work

Much of the work done on price discrimination and the issues related (privacy, ethics
and regulation) to the practice focused on e-commerce. Though the focus of this paper
is on the retail environment, there are still many parallels between the more static
brick-and-mortar environment and the dynamic world of online retailers. Like
Facebook and Google, whose main source of revenue is derived from targeted ads,
with the use of personal information captured from loyalty card program
memberships coupled with sophisticated point-of-sales printers1, retailers are able to
collect data in real time, and respond to consumer demands quickly. The reality of
which is that real and online environments are converging.

6

Conclusion

To be clear, this study is correlational only: it does not reveal a causative link between
the demographic variable of income and retail prices paid. Particularly, considering
the limited nature of the dataset used for this analysis, as delineated in section 3.1. We
cannot therefore definitely say whether price discrimination was a factor in the results
we observed. Moreover, the magnitude of the income-based difference in total spend,
retail discount received, and proportion of discount/total was quite weak, as indicated
in small effect sizes in the ANOVA tests and low R2 values in our exploratory linear
regression models. However, interpreted through the lens of business analytics, if
targeting pricing strategies were employed, such effects would need to be quite small
and unnoticeable: indeed, it is hard to imagine that total expenditures and discounts
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could be driven by income to a notable extent without consumer backlash. This is
consistent with the literature on this issue: for example, Benjamin Shiller [10] in their
study of the characteristics of the Netflix subscription base produced a statistically
significant model relating subscriptions to web use that only accounted for 8 to 12%
of variance explained. While our results cannot support any claims regarding
demographic-based price discrimination, differences in spending as a function of
income is nevertheless consistent with this hypothesis. It is expected that high-income
people would spend more; however, coupled with a non-significant difference in
discounts between the income levels, it is clear that high-income consumers received
a lower proportional discount than others. If income was unrelated to the proportion
of total spending that was discounted, we would expect to observe no differences on
this variable between income groups. As stated previously, there are numerous
plausible explanations for this result. However, price discrimination should not be
ruled out as a possible variable. Further research is necessary to test this claim, though
with the proprietary nature of most commercial pricing algorithms, “smoking gun”
evidence will likely be difficult if not impossible to gather.

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol1/iss1/14

14

Wallmark et al.: Consumer Welfare and Price Discrimination

A. Appendix: Dataset Details
Table 1. HH_DEMOGRAPHIC (801 HOUSEHOLDS)

Variable
Household_Key
Age_Desc
Maritial_Status_Code
Income_Desc
Homeowner_Desc
HH_Comp_desc
Household_Size_Desc
Kid_Category_Desc

Description
Uniquely identifies each household
Estimated age range
Marital Status (A-Married, B-Single, U-Unknown
Household income
Homeowner, renter, etc.
Household composition
Size of Household up to 5+
Number of Children present up to 3+

Table 2. TRANSACTION_DATA (2500 HOUSEHOLDS)

Variable
Household_Key
Basket_ID
Day
Product_ID
Quantity
Sales_Value
Store_ID
Coupon_Match_Disc
Coupon_Disc
Retail_Disc
Trans_time
Week_no

Published by SMU Scholar, 2018

Description
Uniquely identifies each household
Uniquely identifies a purchase occassion
Day when transaction occured
Uniquely identifies each product
Number of the products purchased during the trip
Amount of dollars retailer receives from sale
Identifies unique stores
Discount applied due to retailer’s match of manufacturer
coupon
Discount applied due to manufacturer coupon
Discount applied due to retailer’s loyalty card program
Time of day when the transaction occurred
Week of the transaction. Ranges 1-102

15
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B Appendix: Program Code
Source code for data wrangling, visualization and analysis is available at the link
provided below:
goo.gl/MEhraL
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